1 BEFORE THE POLLUTION CONTROL HEARINGS BOARD 2 STATE OF WASHINGTON 3 IN THE MATTER OF A DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY ORDER 4 CANCELLING A PERMIT GRANTED TO QUENTIN H. ELLIS and 5 MARIAN HUNTER TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC SURFACE WATER, 6 QUENTIN H. ELLIS and 7 MARIAN HUNTER, 8 PCHB No. 82-190 Appellants, 9 FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT, ٧. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 10 STATE OF WASHINGTON, ORDER DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY, 11 Respondent. 12

This matter, the appeal of a Department of Ecology order cancelling a permit to appropriate public surface waters, came on for hearing before the Pollution Control Hearings Board, Gayle Rothrock, Chairman, David Akana and Lawrence J. Faulk, Members, convened at Lacey, Washington, on October 10, 1983. Administrative Law Judge William A. Harrison presided. Respondent elected a formal hearing

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pursuant to RCW 43.21B.230.

Appellant Quentin H. Ellis appeared and represented himself. Respondent appeared by Patricia Hickey O'Brien, Assistant Attorney General. Reporter Bibi Carter reported the proceedings.

Witnesses were sworn and testifed. The exhibits were examined. From testimony heard and exhibits examined, the Pollution Control Hearings Board makes these

## FINDINGS OF FACT

Appellants, Quentin H. Ellis and Harian Hunter, applied to the State Department of Ecology (DOE) to appropriate public surface waters from two springs on their land in Stevens County. This application, made November 9, 1977, sought an appropriation for domestic supply. A permit was granted by DOE on August 10, 1978.

ΙI

The permit granted by DOE required construction for the appropriation to begin by October 1, 1979. When construction did not begin, DOE extended the time to October 1, 1980. When construction still did not begin, DOE extended the time further to October 1. 1931. When construction even then did not begin, DOD extended the time yet again to October 1, 1982. When it appeared to DOF that appellants would not meet the latest extension, and after opportunity for the appellants' to show cause, DOE cancelled the permit by Order of October 18, 1982.

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Appellants do not reside on the land in question. Mr. Ellis and his sister, Ms. Hunter, reside in Renton. Their grandfather homsteaded 160 acres of the 280-acre site in the early 1900's. That homestead encompassed the location of the two springs.

ΙV

III

The land has not been actively lived upon since the late 1940's.

The land is currently used only for timber growing. The surface water flowing from the two springs is used only by free-roaming livestock and wildlife.

Appellants state that such rights to divert the surface water as may have been acquired by their grandfather were not claimed by the filing procedure set forth in chapter 90.14 RCW, Water Rights - Registration - Waiver and Relinquishment, Etc.

VΙ

Appellants stipulate that they have not begun construction of any means for appropriating water for domestic use. They stipulate that the permits and extensions have allowed enough time to do so.

Appellants state that they have no plans for any development on the site at this time.

VII

The gravamen of appellants' appeal is that they are entitled to the permit in question because of the origin of the surface water on their land or because of a right to divert acquired at the time the

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land was homesteaded.

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There does not appear to be any water shortage in the area where this case arises.

IΧ

Any Conclusion of Law which is deemed a Finding of Fact is hereby adopted as such.

From these Findings the Board comes to these

## CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I

Any right to divert the surface water which may have been acquired by appellants' grandfather at the time of homestead is not before us for review. Such a right pre-dates the Water Code of 1917, chapter 90.03 RCW, whereas we are now reviewing the cancellation of a permit issued under that 1917 Code.

ΙI

The Water of Code of 1917 declares:

...Subject to existing rights all waters within the state belong to the public, and any right thereto, or to the use thereof, shall be hereafter acquired only by appropriation for a beneficial use and in the manner provided and not otherwise; and, as between appropriations, the first in time shall be the first in right... RCW 90.03.010 (Emphasis added.)

<sup>1.</sup> This right could, conceivably, come before us for review or could be reviewed by the Superior Court in a general adjudication of water rights (See RCW 90.03.110-.240). In either case the use (or non-use) of such right and failure to file a claim for it will bear upon the rights' continued existence. RCW 90.14.160 and 90.14.071.

The origin of the surface water on appellants' land does not entitle them to the permit in question which was granted under the 1917 Code.

III

The Water Code of 1917 further declares, with regard to permits to appropriate public water and their cancellation:

90.03.320 Appropriation procedure--Construction Actual construction work shall be commenced on any project for which permit has been granted within such reasonable time as shall be prescribed by the supervisor of water resources, and shall thereafter be prosecuted with diligence and completed within the time prescribed by the supervisor. The supervisor, in fixing the time for the commencement of the work, or for the completion thereof and the application of the water to the beneficial use prescribed in the permit, shall take into consideration the cost and magnitude of the project and the engineering and physical features to be encountered, and shall allow such time as shall be reasonable and just under the conditions then existing, having due regard for the public welfare and public intersts affected: for good cause shown, he shall extend the time or times fixed as aforesaid, and shall grant such further period or periods as may be reasonable necessary, having due regard to the good faith of the applicant and the public interests affected. terms of the permit or extension thereof, are not complied with the supervisor shall give notice by registered mail that such permit will be canceled unless the holders thereof shall show cause within sixty days why the same should not be so canceled. If cause be not shown, said permit shall be canceled.

A further extension would go beyond the time necessary to develop the stated use. Instead, it would serve as affirmation of appellants' right to the public water in question, for domestic purposes, without any present plans to use it for such. This is at direct variance with the policy of the 1917 Code that any right for the use of such water

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be acquired only by appropriation, and is hence contrary to the public interest and violative of RCW 90.03.320. The cancellation of this permit by DOE should be affirmed.

ΙV

Should appellants' wish to possess a permit to appropriate the water in question there are several alternatives. Among these are to apply for a permit for stock watering or wildlife maintenance, or any other beneficial use as set forth at RCW 90.54.010. Such permits will be limited, however, to the amount of water necessary for such uses. see RCW 90.03.290. Appellants could also reapply for a domestic permit when plans for a domestic use are actually made. Appellants speculate that if they wait to reapply for a domestic permit, others will apply first and obtain earlier priority. That is possible. Yet, the strict rule of the 1917 Water Code that first in time is first in right may not apply, depending entirely on the circumstances. Water Resources Act of 1971, Chapter 90.54 RCW, requires allocation of waters among potential users based upon securing maximum net benefits. RCW 90.54.020(2). Adequate and safe supplies of water shall be preserved and protected in potable conditions to satisfy human domestic needs. RCW 90.54.020(4). These principles could, depending on circumstances, uphold a future donestic use by appellants over an earlier non-domestic use. Such a determination cannot be made while appellants plan for human use of the water remains evanescent, unclear, and wraith-like.

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V Any Finding of Fact which should be deemed a Conclusion of Law is hereby adopted as such. From these conclusions the Board enters this ORDER The Department of Ecology Order cancelling appellants' permit to appropriate public surface water (Permit No. S3-25728P) is hereby affirmed. DONE at Lacey, Washington, this  $\frac{72}{2}$  day of November, 1983. POLLUTION CONTROL HEARINGS BOARD See Dissenting Opinion LAWRENCE J. FAULK, Member WILLIAM A. HARRISON Administrative Law Judge L FINDINGS OF FACT CONCLUSIONS OF LAW & ORDER

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In 1967, the Legislature adopted SB 175 having to do with water rights (RCW 90.14).

In RCW 90.14, the words "without sufficient cause" are used to describe the circumstances when a water right can be relinquished. The Senate Journal on February 24, 1967 recounts the debate concerning this section of the law. Senator Guess made the comment that "If a person could give sufficient cause for failing to use the water than this would be taken into account." Senator Hallauer, in answer to a question, said, "If there are adequate waters, there would be no problem."

It is obvious that Legislation dealing with water rights is designed not only to make water available to the public for appropriate use and to protect it from being wasted; but just as importantly to preserve and protect the water rights of our citizens. It seems to me that is the point Senators Guess and Hallauer were trying to make in 1967.

There is no evidence in this matter that any person is being denied access to a supply of water because of the existence of appellant's surface water permit. There also is no evidence that the maintenance of appellant's surface water permit is resulting in any injury or damage of any vested or existing right or rights under permits for this water.

The source of this water are two springs originating on appellant's property which was homesteaded by his grandfather prior to 1917. There does not appear to be any water shortage in this area. Abandonment or non-use of water is no longer the basis for cancelling a permit having been eliminated by the Legislature in 1967.

The Department of Ecology has authority to extend a permit beyond any term initially established for actual appropriation. I believe DOE should allow the appellant the use of the water until and if a subsequent application is made, which if granted, would preclude the continuance of appellant's permit because of the quantity of water available for appropriation.

The appellant was honest enough to indicate he did not intend to use the water, but he did not want to loose it. This seem reasonable to me in that there is water available and nobody else has a need for it.

Be that as it may, I think we, as a Board, have a duty to interpret and apply the statutes in a manner that furthers justice, and therefore I believe the Department of Ecology Order of Cancellation should be reversed.

AVRENCE J. FAULK, Member